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KIERKEGAARD AND EXISTENCE
COMMUNICA TIONS
John H. Whittaker

Kierkegaard occasionally mentions a type of belief which he calls an "existence communication," and his discussion of such beliefs parallels his discussion of subjective truths (in
the Concluding Unscientific Postscript). Existence communications include religious
beliefs. I suggest that it is less misleading to focus on this term than it is to wrestle with
the difficult and overworked notion of subjective truths; ultimately, his view of religious
beliefs can be seen more clearly.
His view does not fully emerge, however, without the assistance of some other concepts.
My thesis is that existence communications are comparable in their resistance to objective
fOnTIS of adjudication to first principles, and comparable in their "self-involving" characteristics to teleological principles about the "raison d'etre of existence.
This account not only helps to clarify Kierkegaard's discussion, but it also offers two
important hints about modern problems regarding religious belief. It suggest that religious
claims may indeed be truth claims, and it suggests that there is more to the justification
than comes out in a consideration of evidence.

One of the most puzzling things that Kierkegaard ever said was that "subjectivity is
truth." The chapter on this dark idea in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript is almost impossible to understand. It seems to express an idea which, if not obviously
false, is counter-intuitive and easily criticized. For how can the passion-the
"subjectivity"-involved in the affirmation of a belief vouch for the truth of that belief? Subjectivity has to do with persons, but the truth or falsity of a belief depends on
the way the world is; and it is hard to see how Kierkegaard could have connected
personal characteristics with facts about the world. Yet at the same time, the idea that
subjectivity is truth informs a whole range of insightful observations about the nature
of religious beliefs. Religious beliefs are not tentative affirmations of hypotheses , they
cannot be confirmed solely by "the facts," their affirmation requires decisiveness, and
their adoption brings with it a whole new way of life-these are all genuine insights.
And because of them, Kierkegaard's discussion of subjectivity and truth retains a
lingering fascination for philosophers of religion, who return to this chapter in the
Postscript time and again. Something in his thinking seems to be right; and it seems
worthwhile to dig it up, dust it off, and hold it up to view.
In any case, I would like to take up the question of subjective truth once again.
But instead of beginning with the difficult ideas presented in the section of the
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Postscript entitled ''Truth is Subjectivity," I would like to begin elsewhere. The
starting point that I have in mind is Kierkegaard's discussion of "existence
communications," a term which he uses to describe religious beliefs in the latter
portion of the Postscript. In some ways, this later discussion of religious beliefs
is just as complicated as his earlier discussion. Many of the same conceptsdialectical pathos, historical and eternal truths, objectivity, etc.-DCcur in both
sections. But alongside these concepts appears a new one, the notion of an
"existence communication." And this concept, though still difficult, is plainly
designed to convey the same thoughts which he previously discussed under the
heading of subjective truths. Unlike the former term, however, the notion of
existence communications does not conjure up associations with arbitrary judgments, emotive expressions, private fantasies, irrational convictions, and the
like. It should therefore afford us a fresh look at the heart of Kierkegaard's view
of religious claims.
(1)

Kierkegaard introduces the term "existence communication" to help distinguish
Christian teachings from speculative doctrines.
"Christianity is not a doctrine but an existential communication expressing an existential contradiction. If Christianity were a doctrine it would
eo ipso not be an opposite to speculative thought, but rather a phase
within it. Christianity has to do with existence, with the act existing;
but existence and existing constitute precisely the opposite of speculation"'.
For the moment, we need not worry over the "existential contradiction" that
Kierkegaard mentions in this passage: the important thing is the effort to contrast
Christian claims with philosophical doctrines. Such doctrines are defined by the
fact that they are "not relevant to existing"2. They are to be "intellectually grasped
and speculatively understood," whereas existential communications are to be
"realized in existence"'. Indeed, the only involvement of philosophy in this
matter does not consist in understanding Christian claims as speculative hypotheses but in clarifying the reasons why they cannot be so understood. Toward
this end, Kierkegaard chooses to call Christianity an existential communication,
"in order definitely to indicate its heterogeneity with speculation"4.
Explaining what Kierkegaard meant by "existence communications," then,
means explaining why he thought that Christian beliefs could not be justified as
philosophical hypotheses. This is not an easy thing to do, especially in view of
the fact that philosophers have for centuries tried to interpret and to defend the
central teachings of the faith by justifying theism on speculative grounds. My

170

Faith and Philosophy

sympathies lie with Kierkegaard on this point; but this does not mean that I think
Christian claims are senseless or irrational, that faith is an arbitrary affair, or
that nothing at all can be said for Christian belief. I don't believe that Kierkegaard
did either, but perhaps we should let him speak for himself.
In contrasting Christian teachings and speculative doctrines Kierkegaard does
not deny the obvious fact that Christianity is set forth in doctrinal propositions.
Existence communications, in other words, are doctrines of a sort. The are
beliefs, for the term "existence communication" does not refer to the act of
communication but to the content of what is communicated, just as the term
"belief' can be used to refer to a proposition rather than to the act of believing.
Thus, Kierkegaard sometimes speaks of Christian doctrines, and uses this phrase
interchangeably with "existence communications," but only when there is no
danger of confusing Christianity with speculative theories 5 • His point is to distinguish Christian doctrines in kind from philosophical doctrines; and though he
does not do this very systematically, it is still possible to trace the main lines
on which this distinction is drawn.
He calls Christian teachings "existence communications" because they confront
the individual with the challenge, not of interpreting Christian doctrines speculatively, but of existing in these beIiefs 6 • They are to be "realized in existence"7.
The "appropriation" of Christian claims is even said to be more important than
the abstract question of their truths. Kierkegaard' s point here, which he undoubtedly overdramatized, is that philosophical doctrines can be believed without the
believer determining his life "in conformity therewith"9. But religious doctrines
must be adhered to as personal guides if they are to be believed at all. The form
of assent which acknowledges religious truths but does not express this acknowledgement in personal transformation simply is not religious belief.
One might well interrupt here to ask what is wrong with breaking religious
belief down into two steps: first, the justification of beliefs on philosophical
grounds and then the adherence to them as guides for one's personal life. This
may seem like the most prudent way to picture belief, but Kierkegaard's entire
discussion of faith's logic is intended to show that this view distorts the nature
of faith claims. For one cannot understand Christian claims without understanding
them in relation to oneself; and if one foregoes this personal approach by
attempting to construe these claims impersonally, as if they concerned only the
world and not oneself, then he winds up with a caricature of faith. That is why
Kierkegaard makes fun of philosophers who have three proofs for immortality
but who do not live in the ways that one would expect this belief to entail. It is
not simply that such philosophers do not practice what they preach; Kierkegaard's
complaint is that immortality cannot be impersonally confirmed to begin with.
Even Socrates knew this, for Kierkegaard credits him with doubting his own
arguments for immortality-for saying "if' there is an immortality-and then
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dying with remarkable courage. He did not first justify the belief in immortality
and then abide by it; the manner of his death embodied his faith, which did not
exist in a prior, unembodied, form, as if it had been independently confirmed 10.
The type of thinking which belongs to speculative issues-abstract interpretation, the adducing of evidence out of reflection, the attempt to demonstrate
comprehensiveness--does not fit the peculiar requirements of existence communications. Speculative claims are "objective" assertions, which are to be
judged dispassionately in abstraction from one's existential concerns as a concrete
individual. Consequently, the truth or falsity of a speculative claim depends on
evidence of some kind; for that is how the world reports its verdict about the
truth of an objective belief-in terms of evidence. But an existence communication cannot even be understood, let alone justified, on the basis of evidence.
The point of an existence communication only emerges in relation to one's inmost
concerns as an individual, so that it is inevitably misunderstood if it is approached
dispassionately in the absence of such concerns. This, though, is precisely what
happens when existence communications are treated as philosophical doctrines
and judged "objectively." The burden of responsibility for judging their truth is
passed from the individual to the evidence, so that the would-be believer waits
until the evidence becomes decisive, all the while abstracting oneself from the
issue. This abstraction, involved in the dispassionate judgment of an existence
communication, prevents its point from properly emerging.
Gathering evidence of a philosophical or historical nature, therefore, is not a
strategy that one should expect to produce Christian faith. A more fitting approach
is to understand Christian beliefs more and more in relation to one's inward
concerns.
. one does not prepare oneself to become attentive to Christianity
by reading books, or by world-historical surveys, but by immersing
oneself deeper in existence. Every other propaedeutic must eo ipso end
in a misunderstanding, for Christianity is [an] existence-communication ... "".
By "immersing oneself deeper in existence," one's existential "pathos" increases,
so that one becomes more sensitive to the meaning of one's suffering, more
distraught over one's guilt, and more aware of the need for a contented resignation
to finitude '2. Grasping the point of religious claims presumes this deepened
sensitivity, without which they cannot be appreciatively understood.
All this may become clearer if we consider Kierkegaard' s reasons for criticizing
childish Christianity. Presumably, a child might be clever enough to understand
the historical evidence for Christianity, to follow the logic of the "proofs" for
God's existence, and to appreciate the force of other speculative arguments. But
the thought that a child might believe in Christianity fills Kierkegaard with
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contempt. A "child has no decisive use of Christianity"". A child lacks the
sin-consciousness which develops only in maturity and which is a condition for
Christian understandingI'. Consequently,
"the Christianity which is taught to a child, or rather which the child
pieces together for itself when no violence is used to force the little
exister into the most decisive Christian determinants, is not properly
Christianity but idyllic mythology"'5.
Having no sin-consciousness to be relieved by the concept of grace, the child's
belief is innocent; but it is also distorted. Here Christian claims do not serve
their proper purpose, and the child's pointless understanding of the faith is a
mere fantasy. Similarly, the philosopher who treats Christianity dispassionately
as a theoretical doctrine, also misses its point. His picture of the faith is also
distorted, and he judges something that amounts to a mythology-although it is
called something else, such as theism, or Christian philosophy.
Now, if it were possible to bracket one's existential concerns while judging
Christianity dispassionately, then there would be nothing essentially wrong with
childish belief. Then it would make sense to say, "after we have settled the truth
of Christianity, then we can worry about our personal relation to it." And the
only fault of the child would be that it would have to wait until some time after
it had affirmed the truth of Christianity to give it room in a mature life. But
again, the notion that one can separate one's affirmation of a religious teaching
from its incorporation into the domain of inward, personalized, understanding
is the root of the difficulty. Kierkegaard thought that such impersonal affirmations
of Christianity (or of other religions) simply were not possible. Belief under
such circumstances is pointless, and the pointless beliefs thus upheld are not the
same beliefs as those of proper believers.
One of the things that this view of religious beliefs means is that faith must
involve greater decisiveness than the affirmation of speculative hypotheses. For
one cannot leave the issues posed by existence communications to the facts (or
the speculative arguments) to decide, while postponing one's working relationship
to the beliefs in question. The facts, as it were, never speak that loudly, certifying
the truth or falsity of an existence communication so that one can confidently
allow the weight of one's life to rest upon it. Religious claims, that is, are not
knowledge claims; for the possibility of grounding a belief-which applies to
knowledge claims~oes not apply to religious claims '6 . One can never wait
until an existence communication becomes a known truth before resting any
confidence in it. For if there are any such beliefs, they can only be inwardly
held fast in faith, never known on the basis of argumentative grounds.
Because religious beliefs require a decisiveness that grows out of inwardness
or existential pathos, faith entails a transformation in a person's self-understand-
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ing. The objective uncertainty of the issues must be resolved with a personal
commitment; and this commitment can take only one form--abiding by the
beliefs that one affirms. This doesn't mean that one has to follow all of the
practical injunctions of a religion to be a believer. Rather, one's thinking must
conform to the outlook which the faith represents.
When Kierkegaard was engaged in a bitter attack on the Danish church, this
was the heart of his criticism: the Christians which he criticized thought that
they could express their beliefs without expressing them in their lives. They
professed belief, but lacked any of the inward changes that one would expect
in their lives. The problem was not that they sinned by failing to live up to the
moral ideals of Christianity; that kind of failing is only too common. The problem
was that they did not think of themselves as sinners, or feel sinful, or regret
their inadequacy, or do anything that one would expect someone to do who
thought of himself as a fallen creature of God. "What any religion in which
there is any truth aims at," he said, "is a total transformation in a man, to wrest
from him through renunciation and self-denial all that, and precisely that, to
which he immediately clings. 17. But Kierkegaard's fellow Christians showed no
evidence of having undergone any such transformation; for the shape of their
lives was indistinguishable from the life of unbelievers. They did not affirm
Christian claims by thinking of themselves in Christian categories, by ruing their
sins and thanking God for his grace, or by reminding themselves of how far
short they fell of the example of Jesus. Neither their thoughts nor their practice
reflected the beliefs that they professed.
By contrast, those who do show their faith in the shape of their self-understanding become witnesses to the faith that they affirm. This witness makes an
impression on people, particularly if believers must make dramatic sacrifices to
sustain their faith. Kierkegaard calls this the "proof' that is advanced for Christianity-the fact that believers have suffered for their faith 18. Obviously this
"proof' has nothing to do with evidence, but the example of such witnesses has
a persuasive power that helps to make up for the lack of compelling evidence.
So the faith that cannot be justified objectively on argumentative grounds can
at least be illustrated on a personal level, where people are moved by the example
of others whose lives testify to the value of their beliefs.
All of these points about existence communications could be elaborated further,
but perhaps I've said enough to provide a rough understanding. Such teachings
must be brought into relation with mature personal concerns if their import is
to be appreciatively understood, and they cannot be judged by postponing all
personal reliance until a convincing case is made for them on argumentative
grounds. Thus, they require considerable decisiveness for their affirmation, since
the responsibility for judging them cannot be deflected to the "facts" for a
decision. The commitment that one makes in believing them should, moreover,
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entail a transformation in the way that one understands oneself, and this transformation should be reflected in a person's life. Finally, the power of one's personal
example in abiding by such claims, filling them out with the substance of one's
own self-understanding, should provide the persuasive appeal that is needed to
convince others.

(2)
In sum, the distinction between existence communications and speculative
doctrines is the same as the distinction between "subjective truths" and "objective
truths." But like subjective truths, existence communications are decidedly peculiar, so peculiar that one might well object to Kierkegaard's point. Perhaps
subjective claims are not as distinctive as Kierkegaard makes them seem; perhaps
they are ultimately subject to the same general form of justification as other
beliefs. After all, if personal concerns are needed to understand existence communications, then why could not such beliefs be understood personally (by
immersing oneself in existential concerns) and justified like speculative doctrines--on grounds. Such grounds would not have to be overpowering for the
beliefs that rest on them to be reasonably held. Inasmuch as proofs would not
be available, one would still have to venture a certain amount of faith to believe
them; but there is no reason why this faith could not be both reasonable and
personally transforming.
Nevertheless, I think that this interpretation of Kierkegaard's distinction is
wrong. Yet it is almost impossible to say why it is wrong by appealing to the
same concepts that Kierkegaard used. Existence communications are not hypotheses, I want to say. They cannot be left for evidence to decide or to justify, as
if they might be evaluated in the light of speculative arguments or independent
evidence. Rather, they are regulative assertions, which playa different role in
one's thinking about the world. And they are truth claims, despite their resistance
to adjudication on logical grounds. If all this seems odd to say, it is because we
have forgotten to notice a familiar category of similar beliefs-principles. This
is the best way to restate Kierkegaard's view in more commonplace language.
For in describing some of our beliefs as "principles," we implicitly recognize a
difference between them and other truth claims; and beneath this implicit distinction lie many of the same insights which led Kierkegaard to formulate his
distinction.
Actually, the term "principle" is used in several different ways, but I am
thinking of one of its more restricted uses, often indicated by speaking of "first
principles" or of "fundamental principles '9 • Principles are first or fundamental
inasmuch as they have a peculiar relation to justification. Because they define
the form of explanation or description wherever they apply, they resist adjudica-
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tion according to other principles defining other types of relevant evidence. The
evidence which applies to a principle, in other words, is already conceived in a
way that presumes the tmth of the principle in question. So the attempt to base
matters of principle on independent evidence produces only circular arguments.
Fundamental moral principles, for instance, cannot be justified on prudential
grounds because the point of the moral principles is to displace self-centered
reasons for behavior with moral evaluations of it. Thus, one cannot answer the
question "why be moral" by citing the selfish benefits of moral behavior--one
cannot do this, that is, and justify a moral principle as such. A fundamental
moral principle--e.g., the claim that we owe others the same consideration that
we show to ourselves-aims to override pmdential reasoning with a whole new
manner of thinking, moral reasoning. And the form which such reasoning is to
take is defined by the principle itself. Moral reasoning is to tum on the balancing
of people's separate interests, not on guarantees that a selfish interest is served.
So the fact that a person may profit in selfish ways by acting morally has no
relevance for the justification of moral principles.
This means that believing in a moral principle can only be a matter of adhering
to it in the way that one thinks--e.g., by subjecting acts of human behavior to
evaluations based on moral grounds. One who does this shows that he accepts
the principles on which one's handling of various questions-in this case, questions about human behavior-depends. One cannot show that one believes, in
other words, by showing knowledge of the evidence, or by arranging putative
evidence in the most favorable way. Rather, to believe in a principle one has to
abide by it; and one has to abide by it because there is no such thing as resting
the responsibility for judgment on the facts. Factual evidence will not bear the
weight of the true/false decision, and so one cannot leave questions of principle
to the facts to decide, nor can one show that he accepts a principle by citing the
facts which supposedly ground it. This impossibility of transferring the responsibility for judgment to the facts, or of letting the truth or falsity of a principle
be determined by facts, is one of the most outstanding points of commonality
in principles and existence communications.
But the likeness between these two types of assertion does not end there. Since
one must abide by a principle to believe in it, one's belief must be filled out
with the example of compliance in one's life. This means that one must confonn
the manner of one's thinking to the principles that one believes, letting them
serve as guides for the kind of judgment that one makes. One adjusts the form
of explanation to the pattern suggested by the principle, and this affects the way
in which evidence is conceptualized in the principle's domain. Hence, the adoption of new principles, like the affinnation of existence communications, necessarily entails a transfonnation in a believer's thinking. A child who comes to
accept moral principles thinks in a new way about his or her behavior. A
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psychologist who abandons the principles of psychoanalysis for those of
behaviorism alters the kind of explanation envisioned in the study of human
behavior. And a primitive animist who comes to believe in scientific principles
changes the estimation of what counts as relevant evidence for the defense of
natural hypotheses. All these are fundamental changes in outlook brought about
by changes of principle.
As for the defense of truly fundamental principles, rather than being derived
from any more certain premises, they are simply displayed in the thinking and
living that goes with them. In the lives of those whose thought is transformed
by them, they reveal their forcefulness by revealing the capacities that attend
their understanding. One could even say that principles, like existence communications, are defended by being witnessed, or by being illustrated in vivo. If they
further one's understanding of problems in the relevant field, reducing the number
of anomalies by providing workable explanations of existing puzzles, their credibility will be much enhanced. But there will be no way to convert this success
into independent grounds for belief, since the success of a principle is defined
in ways that also presume its truth. So here, too, there is no difference between
fundamental principles and existence communications: the credibility of both
depends on the persuasive power of their embodiment.
This preliminary sketch of the logic of principles should help us to see the
close similarity between existence communications and principles. But can this
comparison stand up under closer scrutiny? One of the puzzling things that
Kierkegaard said about existence communications was that the amount of passion
involved in their affirmation was inversely proportional to their philosophical
intelligibility. The more sense that a doctrine made philosophically, the less
passion it would take to believe it, and vice versa. A doctrine that was wholly
unintelligible philosophically, or absurd, would arouse the greatest passion and
require the greatest "inwardness" for its affirmation. Thus, the maximum passion
required by Christianity corresponds to a teaching that is philosophically senseless. The doctrine that the infinite God became incarnate in the finite man Jesus
is absurdly paradoxical; it resists speculative attempts to comprehend it absolutely,
so there can be no question of defending this doctrine on speculative grounds.
To believe in this doctrine at all, one has to believe it in spite of its philosophical
unintelligibility.
Is there anything comparable to this in the logic of principles? Are any fundamental principles paradoxical? The answer, surprisingly perhaps, is "yes." There
are principles, and not foolish principles, which cannot be understood or justified
philosophically; and many of them occur in familiar areas of discourse.
Consider, for example, the basic principle of Freudian psychology-that is,
the claim that the human psyche has three parts, the ego, the id, and the superego.
According to this principle and its development, psychological difficulties are
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the result of a kind of hiding that takes place between the id and the ego, a
hiding that is accomplished by the superego. The ego is kept unaware of the
desires of the id by the superego, but the superego allows the powerful desires
of the id to be satisfied in a disguised manner, so that the true nature of these
desires is never realized by the ego. The result is behavior with misunderstood
motivation--compulsions, obsessional neuroses, hysteria, and so on. In the treatment of people's psychological problems, this theory has had some success.
Perhaps it has not always informed successful therapies, but I do not want to
deny the usefulness of Freudian principles altogether. Depth psychology arose
on this foundation.
Yet from a philosophical point of view, the theory that the psyche consists of
three parts, the id, the ego, and the superego, is incoherent. The purpose of this
theory is to present psychological difficulties as arising from deception. A person
deceives himself or herself by hiding from view certain subconscious facts, facts
which can only be expressed in ways which prevent the ego from realizing the
true content of one's thoughts. The deception involved, in other words, is selfdeception. But the theory itself presents these problems as if they were instances
of ordinary deception-as if one person, the superego, were deceiving another,
the ego, about the content of the id. The theory, that is, uses fictitious selves to
present cases of self-deception as if they were cases of ordinary lying. This
makes it easier to handle such cases therapeutically, but it fails utterly to explain
how self-deception is possible. How can one and the same person lie to himself?
As an answer to this question, the theory that a person is really three persons,
one of whom lies to the other, is absurd. It does not answer the question at all;
it simply bypasses the difficulty in favor of providing a working way to conceptualize psychological illnesses.
Thus, one should not assume that working principles must be intelligible from
a theoretical, or philosophical, point of view. The principles of Freudian
psychoanalysis are not aimed at abstract philosophical questions, and they do
not even attempt to answer the purely intellectual question of how self-deception
is possible. They are geared instead to the business of therapy, and in this
connection they function fairly well. Perhaps the wave-particle "theory" of light
is another example; this "theory" functions well enough in the workaday business
of physics, but from a purely speculative point of view it is exceedingly difficult
to understand how light can be both a wave and a particle. The mistake is to
suppose that such principles, if they are to be reasonably believed, must be
intelligible from a purely philosophical point of view . That simply is not the case.
The implication of these remarks in relation to Kierkegaard should be obvious.
The fact that Christianity's claim that God was in Christ is paradoxical-i.e.,
that it resists philosophical understanding-does not mean that it cannot be a
credible principle.
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(3)

Nevertheless, I can imagine someone objecting to this comparison between
existence communications and principles on other grounds. For principles do
not have to be edifying in the way that existence communications must. A
Freudian can be committed to the principles of psychoanalysis without being
personally edified, or without having his existence transformed in any fundamental way. He need not undergo any moral transformation, for example; and
neither must he change his spiritual outlook as a consequence of adhering to his
psychological principles. So the adoption of such principles does not seem to
make any existential difference to a person at all. Yet the principles of Christianity,
or of existence communications in general, must make a difference. At least,
they are intended to make a difference, and that is the reason why they are called
existence communications. Their affirmation should make a difference in the
way one copes with the existential problems of being a human being, and
consequently, a difference in self-understanding.
Without trying to elaborate the differences between principles which are
edifying and those which are not, let me simply admit this point. Not all principles
are existentially significant; most of them have little or nothing to do with the
spiritual problems of self-understanding or personal growth. But this does not
mean that the comparison between existence communications and principles is
off the mark; it simply means that existence communications are comparable
only to certain kinds of principle. Instead of throwing out the comparison between
existence communications and principles, therefore, we need to say more exactly
what kinds of principle bear the life-transforming consequences of existential
communications.
Once again, the rudiments of an answer can be found in Kierkegaard's pages.
As he often said, human beings have an absolute felos in life, and religious
claims are plainly connected with the understanding of this end 20 • Indeed, I don't
think that I can find a better term for characterizing the kind of principles that
faith involves: religious beliefs are teleological principles. The are claims which
define one's orientation to ultimate ends, making the pursuit of ultimate happiness
conceivable. They can be understood, therefore, as claims about the ultimate
purpose of life, the value of all that is, or the final point of any of our struggles.
That is why religious beliefs are so often said to concern the meaning of life;
believers reassess themselves and their purposes in the light of an enlarged
conception of life's true ends. In so doing, they change the way they understand
their suffering, for example. Or they change the way they think about their fate.
These changes are, in effect, changes in the meaning that life has for a person,
and they follow from the adoption of teleological principles-whose point is to
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enable just this kind of self-reflection.
Let me try to clarify these remarks by discussing some of these changes in
greater detail. Adopting a religious principle bears implications for the way in
which a person understands and pursues true happiness-his absolute telos, as
Kierkegaard says. And this being the case, the belief in the Christian paradox
should entail a changed view of one's prospects for happiness. But surely it
does. For Christian faith is expressed not simply in the claim that God was in
Christ, but in the claim that God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself.
To believe in the Incarnation is to count oneself a recipient of God's act of
reconciliation; it is to believe that God somehow acted through Christ to extend
forgiveness to everyone, including oneself. So if people's belief is to the point,
they will adhere to this aspect of the teaching. They will count themselves
forgiven.
Counting oneself forgiven, in tum, affects the orientation which one has to
his absolute telos, ultimate happiness. Instead of supposing that this happiness
depends on the fulfillment of conditions, or instead of making self-acceptance
depend on the satisfaction of requirements, believers take God's forgiveness as
their right to affirm themselves despite the fact that these prior conditions have
not been met. They affirm themselves in spite of their inadequacy in measuring
up to the standards which they set for themselves. And they do this without
having earned the right through their own efforts. This does not mean that
believers cease their efforts to improve themselves; the only change concerns
the way in which this effort of self-improvement is understood. No longer does
it represent a task which must be completed before one can fully approve of
himself; it represents a task through which he or she expresses thanksgiving for
having already received the highest good. Thus, believers reside comfortably
within themselves in trying to be good people. No longer must they struggle
with themselves to prove themselves worthy. Their worth, they trust, is already
assured. God, they believe, told them that in becoming incarnate.
Happiness, in short, ceases to be an end that one can pursue by manipulating
means. Rather than being an achievement for which one might congratulate
oneself, it is thought of as a gift for which one gives thanks. According to all
prudential strategies for acquiring lasting happiness, this idea makes no sense.
Indeed, the idea of simply receiving the right to approve of oneself without
having to live up to any prior conditions is absurd. We tend to think of happiness
as something which we must attain for ourselves, something which we must
work at, or earn. So it sounds crazy to us to suppose that ultimate happiness is
not an achievement for which we are responsible. But such is the foolishness of
the Christian faith, which will always be a stumbling block to those who do not
realign their thinking with teachings of grace.
To take one more example, consider the belief about God as the creator and
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sustainer of all that is. I think that it is a misunderstanding of this belief to affirm
it and not to entrust one's own well-being ultimately to God. This is not a
theological point for doctrinal debates; it is a logical point about the nature of
the claim in question. For the claim that God in his wisdom sustains all things
is a teleological principle, and as such it provides a refuge for the ultimate hopes
and fears of individuals in doubt about the direction and purpose of their lives.
Believing in God, in other words, means evaluating oneself in a cosmic perspective. It means trusting in a power that exceeds anything that we know. It means
thinking in terms of providence. That is the perspective that one inherits along
with the belief in God. For God, who sustains all things, also sustains the
believer; and to acknowledge this is eo ipso to bring one's concerns about fate
under the thought of God's care. Here the point that I want to make is that one
cannot affirm a religious teaching and not bring one's personal thoughts into
accordance with the evaluative pattern that it suggests. The reason for this is
that these teachings are not only principles (to be affirmed as guides for thinking)
but teleological principles (to be affirmed as guides for thinking about the ultimate
purposes that make our lives worthwhile). If this were more clearly understood,
one could not affirm religious beliefs without also accepting their implications,
which apply to our personal existence, where questions about happiness, just
deserts, and the meaning of suffering weigh so heavily upon us.
In short, the fact that the affirmation of an existence communication inwardly
transforms one's life is not difficult to understand if existence communications
represent principles governing teleological assessments of life. For in such assessments, various beliefs about the purpose of cosmic life become the means of
evaluating the purpose of one's own life; various beliefs about the suffering of
the world become the means of coping with one's own suffering; various beliefs
about the true end of mankind become the means of grounding one's own hopes
of fulfillment; and various beliefs about the sustenance of God become the means
of searching for providence in one's own life story. All these general beliefs
find their application in the context of individual existence, where the telos to
which they are all related turns out to be the absolute telos of concrete human
concern.
(4)

I'd like to think that this account of existence communications not only helps
to make sense out of Kierkegaard, but that it also makes it easier to address the
complex questions of analytic philosophy which have followed in the wake of
the Postscript. Though I can do no more than to sketch the implications of what
I've said, I would like to close by drawing attention to two of the most important.
One modem question is absolutely basic to the philosophy of religion, and it
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concerns the logical status of religious beliefs, or existence communications.
Are these beliefs genuine truth claims, or are they merely "emotive" expressions
which serve to articulate the passions of those who believe in them? Can religious
paradoxes be true, or are they simply devices for eliciting certain attitudinal
dispositions?
Much of what Kierkegaard has to say about religious beliefs in the Postscript
seems designed to favor an emotivist account. Attitudinal changes do follow
from the adoption of existence communications, for such beliefs are supposed
to reform one's inward life. Yet one can never show that these changes depend
on the affirmation of truth claims, since the truth or falsity of an existence
communication is generally not demonstrable. That is why these beliefs are
comparable to principles-their "firstness" makes them impossible to base on
prior evidence. But this does not mean that existence communications are merely
devices for the expression of attitudes, nor does it mean that they cannot be truth
claims of an indemonstrable sort. It does not even mean that paradoxical claims
cannot be true. The paradoxes in question could be only apparent, or the belief
in them could be true enough, practically speaking, to be relied on as a working
assumption. So for Kierkegaard to dwell on the inward changes that faith entails
does not necessarily mean that religious beliefs are purely emotive expressions.
But how might such claims be true? They might be true or false in the same
way that any principle can be true or false. That fact that such principles are
indemonstrable, either empirically or logically, does not count against their status
as truth claims. It does not count against it, that is, unless we are willing to
allow the same logical priority to count against the cognitive status of principles
in general-and there are too many principles to allow us to do this. There are
scientific principles (e.g., the claim that the future will be like the past), moral
principles (e.g., the claim that we ought not to harm others), psychological
principles (e.g., the claim that all human behavior is a response to genetic
inheritance and stimulus-response conditioning), and many others. How can we
say that all of these claims are pseudo-assertions? Each of them iriforms the kind
of thinking that follows from it, telling us, in effect, that the world will yield
insights to those who adopt the perspective which it defines. Thus, the principle
that nature is uniform tells us that the natural world may be understood by
pursuing natural law explanations, and the principle that we owe others the same
considerations that we give to ourselves tells us that human behavior requires
moral evaluations. But religious principles do the same kind of thing; they tell
us that the search for wisdom can be furthered by conforming the judgments
which we make about our existential problems to the standards they suggest.
This mayor may not be true; but if there is any truth to it, it will be learned in
the way that the truth of any indemonstrable principle is learned. It will be
learned, that is, from growing capacitated by a new form of understanding.
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This shows, I think, how formal the notion of a truth claim is. Scientific and
moral and religious truths may be utterly different from one another, so different
that one could not assume that religious truths share any part of their nature with
empirical truths, for example. Too often we assume that true propositions state
facts, and that facts contrast with values, so that all potentially fact-stating claims
have nothing to do with evaluation. But if there are moral truths, then they state
moral facts, and if there are religious truths, then they state religious facts. In
this larger sense of the word "fact," factual judgments no longer contrast with
evaluations; facts are simply the truths which make true propositions true. In
this sense, and only in this sense, might we say that religious principles state
facts. But then, the facts that true religious assertions state would be facts about
the purposiveness of life, about the meaning which the world has, and about the
sense of worth in which people are able to find themselves. They would not be
facts of a sort that contrast with values; they would be understood in the same
formal sense in which truth claims should be understood21 •
The philosophical concern about the logical status of religious claims is obviously related to a religious belief's possible justification. If religious claims, or
existence communications, are not truth claims to begin with, then we need not
worry about their rational justification. The fact that religious beliefs may help
people to understand their lives, and to make sense out of their fate, will not
have anything to do with their truth value. At best, the help rendered by such
beliefs will consist of therapeutic aid in steadying one's emotions, managing
one's fears, and living more comfortably in a psychological sense. Some of
Kierkegaard's interpreters think of this emotional steadying as the subjective
interest out of which believers manufacture their faith. But if religious claims
are truth claims, then their affirmation must be connected with something more
than fear, need, idiosyncrasy, whimsy, or cultural inertia. Their truth value must
be connected with the way the world is. The illumination, or problem-solving
power, that grows out of a religious view of life can be taken as the sign of that
connection. This "power" cannot be turned into objective evidence, but it is
nonetheless a relevant factor in the judgment of principles, and should be just
as relevant in the case of religious principles.
Thus, the fact that Kierkegaard divorces existence communications from objective evidence and connects their affirmation with subjectivity need not mean that
questions of faith are to be decided arbitrarily, or in accordance with one's
personal idiosyncrasies. It means only that logic holds out a place for beliefs
which are not to be tested evidentially. The mistake is to think that beliefs which
cannot be tested against the evidence can only be arbitrarily adopted; indeed, to
think that they cannot be genuine truth claims at all. But there are factors other
then evidence which bear on the adoption of religious principles. The nobility
of a religious outlook, the impression made by those who exemplify it, the
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promise of new understanding which it seems to contain-these are all relevant
to the affirmation of the principles which underlie it. Most importantly, there is
the fit between concepts of a religious view and the shape of one's life. Factors
like these can make the commitment to principles appropriate, even though they
do not in any strict sense constitute evidence. As one grows more deeply aware
of the seriousness and pathos of human existence, one becomes more conscious
of the need to understand life teleologically, and more open to the influence of
religious conceptions. This deepening pathos spawns sensitivity, and as one
becomes more sensitively attuned to the deep things of life, he or she may find
in religious concepts the ready-made expressions for profound sentiments. To
feel as if the concepts of a religious outlook are ready-made for one's feelings
is not yet to believe, I know. But it is to have the disposition to believe; and if
this disposition is not checked by intellectual reservations, it may eventually
expand into full-fledged faith.
In any case, the suggestion that existence communications might be understood
as teleological principles bears two important implications. It suggests that these
beliefs might be truth claims despite their resistance to adjudication on independent grounds, and it implies that there might be more to the problem of their
justification than comes out in a consideration of objective evidence. These two
points, I think, need to be upheld in contemporary debates about the nature of
religious claims. And if existence communications are comparable to teleological
principles, then Kierkegaard can be read as an ally in this cause.
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